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A B S T R A C T   
Marine protected areas (MPAs) are a widely used marine conservation tool designed to preserve marine biodiversity and improve fisheries management. Although 
the environmental benefits of MPAs are well established, evaluating the social and economic impacts of MPAs is challenging. In this paper we quantitatively identify 
the economic and social differences between communities based on whether or not the community has a tabu area in their local fishing ground. This is an area 
permanently closed to fishing within a locally managed marine area (LMMA), a form of MPA in the Pacific region. To do this we analyse survey data at both the 
household and village level in Kadavu, an administrative province of Fiji. We find there are differences in economic activity and diet between the communities but 
little difference in overall income and wealth. Our study shows that villages with an active tabu area have more positive social outcomes in terms of perceptions of 
LMMAs. However, there are some notable negative social outcomes as well. In particular, we find that households not engaged in commercial fishing perceive conflict 
around the management of marine resources. We also find that households engaged in commercial fishing believe penalties for violating LMMA rules are high. 
Together, these results could potentially impede the adoption of LMMAs and tabu areas. Overall, our survey results do not indicate that tabu areas are detrimental or 
beneficial on the whole, either economically and socially.   
1. Introduction 
1.1. Marine protected areas and locally managed marine areas 
Marine protected areas (MPAs) are a widely used marine conserva-
tion tool designed to preserve marine biodiversity and improve fisheries 
management. It is generally accepted that MPAs are effective at 
accomplishing these tasks and even have positive spill-over effects on 
adjacent areas [1–4], especially when the MPA enforces a complete re-
striction on extractive use [5,6]. Given the adverse impacts of marine 
biodiversity loss [7], projected increases in biodiversity loss [8], the 
importance of sustaining fishery stocks [6], and the commitment of 
nations to Aichi Target 11 of the Convention on Biological Diversity [9], 
MPAs are likely to increase in number and size. 
The need to conserve marine biodiversity and preserve fisheries is 
acute in Fiji, where the national economy and citizens’ well-being are 
directly tied to marine resources; fishing and aquaculture alone 
accounted for 1.6% of Fiji’s national GDP in 2016 [10]. To achieve 
marine conservation goals, the Fijian government makes wide use of 
MPAs, mostly in the form of locally managed marine areas (LMMAs). An 
LMMA is an “area of nearshore waters being actively managed by local 
communities or resource-owning groups, or being collaboratively 
managed by resident communities with local government and/or part-
ner organisations” [11]. An LMMA differs from a typical MPA in that 
LMMAs “are characterised by local ownership and/or control”, whereas 
other forms of MPA are usually “designated by levels of management via 
a top-down approach” [11]. An LMMA, in the South Pacific context, is 
rooted in traditional and customary fisheries management [12–14] and 
is designed to gain support and active engagement from the local com-
munity, with the latter being a key condition for the successful and 
lasting implementation of MPAs. 
This approach to marine conservation in Fiji is widespread. For 
example, Fiji’s LMMA network exceeds 10,000 square kilometres and 
covers over 22% of all inshore fishing areas [14]. These LMMAs have 
been observed to obtain positive environmental impacts typical of 
MPAs, with increased biodiversity, restored habitat, and increased fish 
size and abundance [15,16]. As with MPAs generally, the 
socio-economic impacts are less well understood, although positive so-
cial impacts have been found to arise from community involvement in 
the design and management of the MPA [17]. 
LMMAs across Fiji have a range of objectives that reflect community 
goals with differing rules and practices designed to meet these objectives 
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[11]. A common characteristic of LMMAs, however, is the inclusion of 
one or more permanent, well-defined sections in which no extractive use 
of resources may occur [14]. These areas are typically known as no-take 
or tabu areas and account for nearly 600 square kilometres of Fiji’s 
LMMA network. The use of the word “tabu” to describe these areas 
comes from the traditional name of a customary management tool in 
which a section(s) of fishing ground is closed for a period of time (e.g. 
following the death of an important individual in the community). 
Although the environmental benefits of MPAs and LMMAs are well 
established, evaluating their social and economic impacts is challenging. 
These impacts are often unclear due to uncertainty surrounding the 
economic costs and benefits for both extractive and non-extractive users 
[18] and the non-uniformity of social impacts on different individuals 
and groups in the local community [19,20]. While the social impacts of 
MPAs and LMMAs are mixed [19–23], it has been consistently found 
that the effectiveness and longevity of MPAs and LMMAs rely on support 
from the local community. Such support is often obtained through 
stakeholder inclusion in the design process [24–26]. 
Many existing studies on the social and economic impacts of MPAs 
and LMMAs draw conclusions based on qualitative analysis of a modest 
number of semi-structured interviews. In contrast, we use a rigorous 
statistical framework to analyse extensive household- and community- 
level survey data to compare social and economic measures for com-
munities with and without tabu areas. Specifically, we focus on income 
derived from a variety of sources, household wealth, diet, community 
resilience, and attitudes towards LMMAs. The collected data and derived 
results will be of use for both future research and policy design. In terms 
of future research, the establishment of baseline data will allow for 
causal implications of LMMAs to be discovered. In terms of policy 
design, understanding the current state of affairs in Kadavu is beneficial 
for maintaining and extending its own LMMA network. In addition, 
understanding the socio-economic factors correlated with tabu areas 
will signal which of these factors are important to consider when 
implementing or extending a tabu area, allowing for the implementation 
of more effective and efficient fisheries management elsewhere. 
The following subsection of the introduction provides a brief over-
view of the administrative province of Kadavu. The methods section is 
divided into two subsections, one detailing the methods used to collect 
the data and the other detailing the models used to derive the results. 
The results section is divided into five subsections: a subsection detailing 
descriptive statistics of the data; results relating to economic activity; 
results relating to household diet; results relating to general household 
attitudes; and results relating to household attitudes specifically con-
cerning LMMAs. The discussion, conclusions, and acknowledgments 
sections follow. 
1.2. Kadavu, Fiji 
The administrative province of Kadavu consists of many islands that 
form a volcanic archipelago. It is situated south of the largest and most 
populated Fijian island, Viti Levu (Fig. 1). The main island in the 
province, Kadavu, is the third largest island in Fiji and covers an area of 
approximately 430 square kilometres [27]. The province has 75 villages 
spread across nine districts – Nabukelevu, Nacea, Nakaseleka, Ono, 
Ravitaki, Sanima, Tavuki, Yale, and Yawe – with a total population of 
10,167 in 2007 [28]. Infrastructure in the province is underdeveloped, 
with Kadavu having limited roading, limited electric power, and no 
proper sewerage system [29]. 
Most transport in the province is by motorboat, which is costly. Some 
core services are provided in the province, including schooling, limited 
law enforcement, a postal service, and banking. The majority of eco-
nomic activity in Kadavu is based on agriculture and fisheries, largely 
undertaken at a subsistence level. Any trade that does happen typically 
occurs within and between villages in the province, although some 
goods are sold to wholesalers or exported to Viti Levu. The major cash 
crop for the province is yaqona, from which kava is made. Kava is a 
ceremonial drink that is also popularly consumed outside of ceremony 
[30]. Tourism is a small but growing sector [31], driven by the preva-
lence of reefs that are popular for snorkelling and diving, particularly 
the Great Astrolabe reef in the Ono district [32]. 
2. Methods 
2.1. Survey methods 
The survey sample was drawn from 34 villages (45% of all villages in 
the province) across Kadavu’s nine districts (Table 1 and Fig. 2). Villages 
were selected according to both the availability of baseline fisheries data 
and geographical spread. Within each village, the turanga ni koro (village 
headman) was asked to provide basic information on the composition of 
the village and the state of the nearby fisheries and marine protected 
areas. Table 1 summarizes this information. 
Within each village, at least 10 households were surveyed, for a total 
of 346 households. These households included 1576 individual mem-
bers, or over 15% of the provincial population in 2007. Households were 
nominated by the turanga ni koro to broadly represent both the socio-
economic strata within the village and a range of income generation 
activities carried out within the village. If a household was not available, 
it was revisited at a later time. Households and villages were each 
modestly compensated in recognition of respondents’ time and effort. 
The survey was administered by staff from the University of the 
South Pacific in July 2016. The survey questionnaire included detailed 
questions on household demographics, agriculture (particularly 
yaqona), livestock and bees, non-timber forest products, fishing and 
gleaning, wages and other income, durables and wealth, diet and food 
security, natural disasters, fisheries management, and community 
resilience. The survey was administered electronically on tablet com-
puters using version 2.51 of SurveyCTO [33] to facilitate complex 
branching (thereby reducing the overall duration) and to reduce 
data-entry errors. The survey took 50 min, on average, to complete. 
The section on community resilience includes and extends questions 
adapted from Aalbersberg [34] and from Gawith et al. [35] in their work 
on the role of community resilience in mitigating damage from natural 
disasters. Households were asked for their level of agreement on a scale 
of 0–10, with 0 being strongly disagree and 10 being strongly agree, on 
42 statements related to beliefs about the village, the environment, and 
LMMAs. Table 2 shows a subset of these 42 statements used in the 
analysis. Each statement is accompanied by a key for identifying the 
statements in subsequent results tables. These statements relate to atti-
tudes towards the village, the environment and LMMAs. 
2.2. Empirical models 
To understand the economic differences between villages with an 
active tabu area and those without, we analysed household-level survey 
data along with village-level survey data to evaluate household income 
and wealth, the probability of households engaging in specific income- 
generating activities, and household diet. Tobit [36] and probit 
models with the following forms were used: 
Y*¼ f ðHD;HS;ATÞþ ε; where Y ¼
�
Y*if Y* > 0
0 if Y* � 0  
PrðCÞ¼ f ðHD;HS;ATÞ
where HD denotes household demographics, HS denotes household size, 
and AT denotes presence of an active tabu area. The response variable Y 
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Fig. 1. Map of Fiji Islands and Kadavu province [45].  
Table 1 
Basic village information.  
Village District Number of mataqalia Number of households Number of tabu areas Combined tabu area (acres) 
Daviqele Nabukelevu 3 60 1 4 
Kabariki Nabukelevu 3 35 2 2.5 
Levuka Nabukelevu 4 35 1 4 
Nasau Nabukelevu 3 48 1 3 
Daku Nacea 2 18 2 20 
Dravuwalu Nacea 5 45 0 0 
Jioma Nacea 7 47 2 12 
Kadavu Nacea 6 55 1 25 
Nacamoto Nacea 3 34 0 0 
Soso Nacea 4 34 2 8 
Lawaki Nakaseleke 3 25 1 1 
Nakaugasele Nakaseleke 2 13 1 2 
Nukuvou Nakaseleke 4 13 0 0 
Buliya Ono 2 52 0 0 
Dravuni Ono 2 32 0 0 
Nabouwalu Ono 3 23 0 0 
Narikoso Ono 5 22 0 0 
Vabea Ono 4 27 0 0 
Matanuku Ravitaki 4 20 1 1 
Muani Ravitaki 3 43 1 6 
Nasegai Ravitaki 4 55 1 2.5 
Ravitaki Ravitaki 7 59 1 3 
Drue Sanima 4 34 2 1.5 
Naivakarauniniu Sanima 4 16 1 17 
Cevai Tavuki 2 13 1 1 
Galoa Tavuki 4 43 1 2 
Namuana Tavuki 3 46 2 6 
Solodamu Tavuki 3 23 1 1.5 
Tavuki Tavuki 4 26 1 4 
Waisomo Tavuki 5 20 0 0 
Rakiraki Yale 4 32 1 0.25 
Naloutu Yawe 7 35 1 7 
Naqalotu Yawe 2 38 1 2 
Natokolau Yawe 2 12 1 3  
a Fijian clan or landowning unit. 
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includes fishing income, income from yaqona sales, overall income, 
remittances, and wealth, all of which have been transformed by the 
natural logarithm to account for strong positive skewness.1 The response 
variable C includes dummy variables indicating whether a household 
engaged in raising cash crops, engaged in fishing for cash income, and 
recently consumed an easily grown crop, fish, meat, kava, or a general 
protein source (either meat, fish, eggs, legumes or nuts, or dairy prod-
ucts). We defined easily grown crops to be taro, kumara, other root 
vegetables, leafy green vegetables, other vegetables, and potatoes. 
Cassava was omitted due to its status as the ubiquitous food of the re-
gion; 80% of all households had cassava recently. The inclusion of meat 
attempts to identify a substitution effect of tabu areas, while inclusion of 
a general protein source is a conservative attempt to identify differences 
in levels of protein consumption. 
Household demographics include head of household’s age, average 
household age, maximum household member level of education 
(measured in years of schooling), and head of household’s gender. 
Following Jolliffe [37]; household education is measured as the 
maximum education of any household member. 
Household size is simply the number of household members. Pres-
ence of an active tabu is a dummy variable indicating whether the 
household is in a village with an active tabu area. Income, remittances, 
and wealth are measured in Fijian dollars, reported at an annual level. 
The variable of interest here is AT, with all others included as control 
variables. 
To understand the relationship between particular household char-
acteristics and household attitudes (see Table 2), we used tobit models of 
the following form: 




Y*if Y* > 0 and Y* < 10
10 if Y* � 10
0 if Y* � 0  
where HD and HS, as previously defined, are household demographics 
and household size, respectively. EA denotes economic variables and 
ATF denotes dummy variables for engagement in commercial fishing, 
presence of an active tabu area, and an interaction between them. The 
economic variables include whether a household engaged in commercial 
cropping and the natural log of household wealth. The variables of in-
terest are contained in ATF, with all others included as control variables. 
The interaction between an active tabu area and engagement in com-
mercial fishing is to account for the differing relationship that fishing 
and non-fishing households have with tabu areas. 
Due to the sampling structure, errors are clustered at the village level 
[38,39]. In all regressions, the marginal effects are evaluated at the 
means of the explanatory variables unless otherwise stated. The mar-
ginal effects for the probit models are intuitive; it is the increase in 
probability brought about by a one-unit change (or discrete change from 
the base level) of the explanatory variable. In the case of the tobit 
models, multiple marginal effects are available. Here we were interested 
in the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the censored 
outcome. Referring to the above forms, this would be the marginal effect 
on Y rather than Y*, giving the change in level of agreement on the 
11-point scale. 
Using these models, we can establish differences between households 
in villages that do or do not have an active tabu area, but we cannot 
establish any causal conclusions on the effect of an active tabu area. 
Regressions were performed using Stata 15 [40], and we considered 
results to be statistically significant when significant at the 10% level. 
Fig. 2. Map of surveyed villages in Kadavu province.  
1 Many respondents responded ‘zero’ for theses variables. Therefore, these 
variables were incremented by one before being transformed so that variables 
originally at zero were mapped to zero. 
T. Robertson et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Marine Policy 117 (2020) 103950
5
3. Results 
The differences between households with and without tabu areas in 
terms of economic activity, diet, community attitudes and resilience are 
outlined below. Descriptive statistics are outlined in Table 3 and 
regression results in Tables 4–9. 
3.1. Descriptive statistics 
Median household demographics are similar between households 
with and without an active tabu area (Table 3). Median incomes, re-
mittances and wealth, however, differ between the groups. Households 
with no active tabu have a higher median fishing income and a lower 
median yaqona income than households with an active tabu, an un-
surprising result since it is expected that households substitute yaqona 
production for fishing in the presence of an active tabu. Median overall 
income is lower and median wealth is higher in villages with no active 
tabu. As expected, the proportion of households engaged in commercial 
fishing is higher where there is no active tabu, whereas the proportion of 
households engaged in commercial cropping is higher where there is an 
active tabu. 
As a precursor to our main results, we emphasise that we cannot 
establish the causal effect of tabu areas given the limitations of our data. 
In particular, our main findings are at risk of suffering from reverse 
causality, whereby the implementation of a tabu area occurred because 
of some difference in one of the response variables, rather than the 
implementation of a tabu area causing the difference to precipitate. 
Hence, we focus on whether or not differences exist and leave claims of 
causal implications aside. 
3.2. Economic activity 
Using the rich, multivariate regression framework described above, 
Table 4 shows that there is a statistically positive correlation between 
the presence of a tabu area and income from yaqona sales (i.e., yaqona 
incomes are statistically higher among households in villages with active 
tabu areas). Differences in yaqona incomes and remittances for the 
average household are statistically significant, with both being higher 
for average households in the presence of an active tabu area. Note that a 
significant marginal effect should not imply a causal impact of an active 
tabu area either here or among the remaining results; instead, it simply 
indicates that the difference between average households is statistically 
significant. An insignificant coefficient but a significant marginal effect 
for remittances indicates that the correlation between an active tabu 
area and remittances is stronger for the average household, but not 
notable for households further from the average. The probability that a 
household engages in commercial cropping is statistically higher in 
areas with an active tabu; this probability is 23.5% points higher for the 
average household. There is no significant difference in the probability 
that a household engages in commercial fishing between households 
with and without an active tabu area. 
Table 2 
Community resilience and fisheries management questions.  
Results table 
key 
Survey questions on attitudes towards the village, the environment, 
and LMMAs 
Att 1 People in this village/community work together to solve problems. 
Att 2 People in this village/community have clear roles and 
responsibilities for carrying out tasks. 
Att 3 The village/community holds meetings to deal with issues in the 
village/community. 
Att 4 Women are involved in making important decisions in the village/ 
community. 
Att 5 Young people are NOT involved in making important decisions in 
the village/community. 
Att 6 The leadership of this village is NOT effective. 
Att 7 I can rely on groups in this village/community for assistance when 
times are difficult. 
Att 8 The environmental attitude of people in this community is positive. 
Att 9 There is conflict within the community for marine resources. 
LMMA 1 There is a high degree of consensus about the policies of the Locally 
Managed Marine Area (LMMA). 
LMMA 2 The institutions governing the Locally Managed Marine Area 
(LMMA) are credible. 
LMMA 3 Community members understand Locally Managed Marine Area 
(LMMA) rules. 
LMMA 4 Community members agree with Locally Managed Marine Area 
(LMMA) rules. 
LMMA 5 Community members comply with Locally Managed Marine Area 
(LMMA) rules. 
LMMA 6 Community members respect those who enforce Locally Managed 
Marine Area (LMMA) rules. 
LMMA 7 Those who enforce Locally Managed Marine Area (LMMA) rules are 
credible. 
LMMA 8 Penalties for breaking Locally Managed Marine Area (LMMA) rules 
are high. 
LMMA 9 Local values are compatible with the goals of the Locally Managed 
Marine Area (LMMA). 
Note: Some statements are asked in the negative to avoid respondents blindly 
agreeing with all statements. Att designates attitudinal measures. 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics for the households surveyed in Kadavu.   
No active tabu Has active tabu 
Median Lower quartile Upper quartile Median Lower quartile Upper quartile 
Head of household’s age (years) 47.5 38 59 48 37 59 
Average household age (years) 28.7 21.3 38 29.3 21.2 40.5 
Highest household education (years) 12 11 12 12 11 14 
Household size 3 2 4 3.5 2 5 
Income (FJ$) 6850 2600 13,800 4598 1800 9950 
Fishing income (FJ$)a 1590 675 9500 720 240 1877 
Yaqona income (FJ$) 600 0 2750 1422 140 3500 
Remittances (FJ$) 0 0 500 200 0 600 
Wealth (FJ$) 1928 858 23,638 3583 1555 9501    
Percentage   Percentage 
Female head of household 5.60%   10.50% 
Engages in commercial cropping 58.90%   81.30% 
Engages in commercial fishing   34.40%   24.60% 
Observations   90   256  
a Fishing income medians were restricted to households engaged in commercial fishing as the median values among all households was 0. This leaves fishing income 
artificially high relative to the other categories. 
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3.3. Household diet 
The probabilities of consuming easily grown crops and consuming 
fish have significant coefficients and significant marginal effects where 
there is an active tabu area (Table 5). In villages with an active tabu 
area, the probability of consuming an easily grown crop is higher by 
19.7% points and the probability of consuming fish is lower by 16.4% 
points. Active tabu areas have no significant coefficients for the proba-
bility that a household consumes a protein source, meat, or kava. The 
marginal effect of having an active tabu area is significant for the 
probability of consuming a protein source, indicating that where there is 
an active tabu, the average household has a lower probability of 
consuming a protein source of 10.6% points. Like remittances, this 
suggests that the correlation between active tabu areas and protein 
consumption is stronger for the average household relative to house-
holds further from the average. 
3.4. Household attitudes 
Community resilience results are outlined in Tables 6 and 7 (the 
definitions of the variables are listed in Table 2). We include a joint 
interaction variable “Commercially fishes & has active tabu” to define 
the joint effect of being a household engaged in commercial fishing 
where there is an active tabu area. A Wald test assesses the statistical 
difference (labelled as ATF F-statistic and associated p-value) in level of 
agreement between fishing households with no active tabu area and 
fishing households with an active tabu area. Table 7 shows the calcu-
lated marginal effects of an active tabu area with respect to average non- 
commercial fishing and commercial fishing households. Fig. 3 shows the 
distribution of responses among households for community resilience. 
Among commercial fishing households, those with active tabu areas 
have higher levels of agreement with the following statements: “People 
in this village/community have clear roles and responsibilities for car-
rying out tasks” (Att 2); “I can rely on groups in this village/community 
for assistance when times are difficult” (Att 7); and “The environmental 
attitude of people in this community is positive” (Att 8) (Table 6, ATF F- 
statistic). For the average commercial fishing household, agreement 
with these statements is about one point higher on the scale of agree-
ment when in the presence of an active tabu area (Table 7). These results 
Table 4 
Household economic indicators (tobit model) and commercial activity (probit model).   
ln(Income) ln(Fishing Income) ln(Yaqona Income) ln(Remittances) ln(Wealth) Pr(Cropping)a Pr(Fishing)a 
Demographicsb Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Has active tabu   0.156 (  0.86)   2.215 (  1.37) 2.334* (1.73) 1.755 (1.59) 0.253 (0.72) 0.702** (2.13)   0.253 (  1.17) 
Constant 7.589*** (9.80) 6.688* (1.78) 4.148* (1.67)   4.753* (  1.86) 5.200*** (7.17) 0.324 (0.52) 0.615 (1.03) 
Marginal effects at means 
Has active tabu   0.156 (  0.86)   0.796 (  1.34) 1.877* (1.92) 1.126* (1.74) 0.253 (0.72) 0.235* (1.87)   0.0852 (  1.17) 
Observations 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 
t and z statistics in parentheses. 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.010. 
a Refers to the probability of engaging in commercial cropping or commercial fishing. 
b Demographic control variables include head of household’s age, average household age, highest household education, head of household gender, and household 
size; “Yes” indicates that these variables were included in the regression. 
Table 5 





Pr(Fish) Pr(Meat) Pr(Kava) 
Demographicsa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




















Marginal effects at means 










Observations 346 346 346 346 346 
z statistics in parentheses. 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.010. 
a Demographic control variables include head of household’s age, average 
household age, highest household education, head of household gender, and 
household size; “Yes” indicates that these variables were included in the 
regression. 
Table 6 
Household village and environmental attitudes (tobit model).   
Att 1 Att 2 Att 3 Att 4 Att 5 Att 6 Att 7 Att 8 Att 9 
Demographicsa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





















1.288* (1.89)   2.849*** 
(  3.12) 
0.167 (0.12)   0.148 
(  0.13) 
0.221 (0.14) 0.117 (0.13) 










0.871 (0.77) 0.438 
(0.47) 
0.736 (0.67) 2.388*** 
(2.66) 














1.451 (0.88)   1.757 
(  1.52) 
ATF F-statistic 1.192 3.803* 1.543 2.437 1.668 2.112 2.841* 2.865* 0.282 
p-value 0.276 0.0520 0.215 0.119 0.197 0.147 0.0928 0.0914 0.596 
Observations 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 
t statistics in parentheses. 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.010. 
a Demographic control variables include head of household’s age, average household age, highest household education, head of household gender, household size, 
and the natural log of household wealth; “Yes” indicates that these variables were included in the regression. 
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suggest that among commercial fishing households, those with active 
tabu areas believe their communities are better organised, more reliable, 
and view the environment more positively. The marginal effect of an 
active tabu area is not significant for Att 8, suggesting a weaker corre-
lation with active tabu areas for the average commercial fishing 
household (Table 7). Across households the responses to Att 2 and Att 8 
were consistent, with most households agreeing or strongly agreeing. 
Responses to Att 7 were more heterogeneous, however, with nearly 10% 
of respondents strongly disagreeing and nearly 40% of respondents 
strongly agreeing (Fig. 3). 
For households in villages with no tabu area, those that commer-
cially fish have significantly higher agreement with “Women are 
involved in making important decisions in the village/community” (Att 
4), and have significantly lower levels of agreement with “Young people 
are NOT involved in making important decisions in the village/com-
munity” (Att 5) than those that do not commercially fish (Table 6). This 
finding implies that, among households with no tabu area, commercial 
fishing households believe their communities are more inclusive; among 
households with a tabu area, we see no difference between commercial 
fishing and non-commercial fishing households. The responses to Att 5 
were more varied than for Att 4, with 12% of respondents strongly 
agreeing and 41% strongly disagreeing (Fig. 3). 
Households in villages with active tabu areas have significantly 
greater agreement with “The village/community holds meetings to deal 
with issues in the village/community” (Att 3) and “There is conflict 
within the community for marine resources” (Att 9) (Table 6). As the 
ATF F-statistics are insignificant for Att 3 and Att 9, this difference is 
only present among non-commercial fishing households (Table 6). This 
result suggests that non-commercial fishing households with tabu areas 
believe their communities are more collaborative when dealing with 
issues but also perceive greater challenges around their marine re-
sources, relative to non-commercial fishing households without a tabu 
area. That this perception of increased conflict is not present for com-
mercial fishing households could indicate a failure of engagement with 
non-commercial fishing households about tabu areas. Of all the com-
munity resilience statements, responses to Att 3 were the most consis-
tent, with over 60% of respondents strongly agreeing. Responses to Att 9 
were more varied, with most households believing there was no conflict 
within the community around the management of marine resources, but 
with others disagreeing (Fig. 3). 
Commercial cropping households have higher levels of agreement 
with “People in this village/community work together to solve prob-
lems” (Att 1). One interpretation of this is that there is more collabo-
ration between those who farm as opposed to those who do not. This 
Table 7 
Marginal effects of active tabu areas on household village and environmental attitudes (tobit model).   


























Observations 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses. 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.010. 
Table 8 
Household attitudes toward locally managed marine areas (tobit results).   
LMMA 1 LMMA 2 LMMA 3 LMMA 4 LMMA 5 LMMA 6 LMMA 7 LMMA 8 LMMA 9 
Demographicsa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 


















Commercially fishes 2.635** 
(2.35) 
















2.202 (1.23) 3.342** 
(2.41) 
1.307 (0.80)   0.646 
(  0.32) 
2.633 (1.47) 
Commercially fishes & has 
active tabu 












ATF F-statistic 7.795*** 1.762 4.384** 6.198** 2.514 3.092* 0.0340 11.88*** 1.459 
p-value 0.00554 0.185 0.0370 0.0133 0.114 0.0796 0.854 0.000638 0.228 
Observations 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 
t statistics in parentheses. 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.010. 
a Demographic control variables include head of household’s age, average household age, highest household education, head of household gender, household size, 
and the natural log of household wealth; “Yes” indicates that these variables were included in the regression. 
Table 9 
Marginal effects of active tabu areas on household attitudes toward LMMAs (tobit model).   



















Commercially fishes 1.900** 
(2.48) 










Observations 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses. 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.010. 
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result could be related to households helping each other to address 
challenges like controlling weeds and pests. 
3.5. Household attitudes toward LMMAs 
Household attitudes towards LMMAs are outlined in Table 8, with 
Table 9 showing the calculated marginal effect of an active tabu area 
with respect to commercial fishing and non-commercial fishing house-
holds. Fig. 4 shows the distribution of responses to each statement. The 
ATF F-statistic, as above, is to ascertain whether there is a statistical 
difference between households that commercially fish in villages with 
and without active tabu areas. 
Households with an active tabu area have statistically higher 
agreement with the statements “There is a high degree of consensus 
about the policies of the LMMA” (LMMA 1) and “Community members 
respect those who enforce LMMA rules” (LMMA 6). Agreement with 
these statements for the average household is anywhere from 1.4 to 2.6 
points higher when in the presence of an active tabu area, with the 
greatest differences for non-commercial fishing households (Table 9). 
Among households with no active tabu area, those engaged in com-
mercial fishing also have higher agreement with these statements 
(Table 8). Responses to LMMA 1 are consistent, with nearly 60% of re-
spondents in strong agreement and 78% of all respondents agreeing or 
strongly agreeing. Responses to LMMA 6 were less consistent, with a 
small but noticeable number of households strongly disagreeing with the 
statement (Fig. 4). 
Households in villages with an active tabu area have statistically 
higher levels of agreement with the statements “Community members 
understand LMMA rules” (LMMA 3) and “Community members agree 
with LMMA rules” (LMMA 4) for both those that do and do not 
commercially fish. Average households in villages with active tabu areas 
have higher levels of agreement with LMMA 3 and LMMA 4 by 1.7–2.2 
points on the scale of agreement (Table 9). This finding suggests that 
households in villages with active tabu areas generally view LMMA rules 
more favourably. For non-commercial fishing households, those with 
active tabu areas have statistically higher agreement for the statement 
“The institutions governing the LMMA are credible” (LMMA 2) 
(Table 8), relative to those with no active tabu areas. The average non- 
commercial fishing household has a level of agreement that is 1.9 points 
higher when in the presence of an active tabu area (Table 9). This 
finding implies that non-commercial fishing households with active tabu 
areas believe LMMA governance is more credible relative to non- 
commercial fishing households with no active tabu areas. Household 
responses to LMMA 2, LMMA 3 and LMMA 4 were relatively consistent 
(Fig. 4). 
Households located in villages with no active tabu areas and who 
commercially fish have significantly higher agreement with “Those who 
enforce LMMA rules are credible” (LMMA 7) and “Local values are 
compatible with the goals of the LMMA” (LMMA 9) relative to house-
holds that do not fish commercially (Table 8). For households in villages 
with active tabu areas, only LMMA 9 has statistically higher levels of 
agreement among households who fish commercially.2 This finding 
suggests that commercial fishing households have more positive views 
of LMMA goals and that, among households with no active tabu areas, 
commercial fishing households believe LMMA enforcers to be more 
Fig. 3. Distribution of household attitudes toward the village and the environment.  
2 This result is not present in the tables but is determined by a Wald test 
similar to the ATF F-statistic. 
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credible, with this difference in belief disappearing for households in 
villages with active tabu areas. Household responses to LMMA 7 were 
highly variable, while the responses to LMMA 9 were quite homoge-
neous (Fig. 4). 
Overall, households that commercially fished and cropped have 
statistically lower levels of agreement with the statement “Penalties for 
breaking LMMA rules are high” (LMMA 8). However, households 
located in villages with active tabu areas and who fish commercially 
believed that the penalties were high. It is not surprising that those who 
would be most impacted by the penalty would believe the penalty was 
high (Table 8). Average commercial fishing households have levels of 
agreement that are 2.6 points higher for LMMA 8 when in the presence 
of an active tabu area (Table 9). The household responses were highly 
variable for LMMA 8, with 42% of respondents strongly disagreeing and 
16% strongly agreeing (Fig. 4). There were no significant relationships 
for “Community members comply with LMMA rules” (LMMA 5) 
(Table 8). 
4. Discussion 
Establishing MPAs that do not allow extractive use increases marine 
biodiversity and replenishes fisheries [41]. Given the important link 
between the socio-economic impacts of an MPA and its effectiveness and 
longevity, understanding the socio-economic differences between 
Kadavu villages with and without active tabu areas can help shed light 
on the effectiveness of tabu areas and, more broadly, their imple-
mentation within an LMMA context. 
As noted earlier, our findings are not of a causal nature but are 
instead correlative. Hence, we remain open to reverse causality and 
assume that it may underlie observed differences among households 
with and without tabu areas. 
We find that households in villages with an active tabu area 
disproportionately engage in other commercial activities; for Kadavu, 
this activity is yaqona production. The engagement in other commercial 
activities can be beneficial from the village perspective; the village wide 
impact of natural disasters can often be mitigated by having diverse 
income streams. We also find that overall levels of income and wealth do 
not differ between households with and without active tabu areas. The 
finding regarding engagement in other commercial activities is consis-
tent with that of Leisher et al. [23]; who found that villages with active 
tabu areas had higher levels of non-fishing income. However, Leisher 
et al. also found that higher overall levels of income and wealth were 
associated with households with an active tabu area, whereas we find no 
statistical difference in wealth or overall income between households in 
villages with and without active tabu areas. In the villages studied by 
Leisher et al., the close proximity to Suva (Fiji’s capital city) provided a 
number of alternative income opportunities. In Kadavu, there is no large 
metropolitan area and therefore limited alternative income sources. An 
implication of this finding is that tabu areas appear to present fewer 
constraints in the presence of alternative income sources, especially 
those that are not restricted by the tabu and increase in line with marine 
conservation such as tourism and research. 
The absence of a relationship between active tabu areas and com-
mercial fishing activity and fishing income is somewhat surprising. A 
priori, we expect more commercial fishing in villages without active tabu 
areas. This result may be driven by the noted spill-over impacts of tabu 
areas [42,43]: even though fishing can no longer occur in a section of the 
fishing ground, the spill-over impact may increase fishing yield in the 
Fig. 4. Distribution of household attitudes towards LMMAs.  
T. Robertson et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Marine Policy 117 (2020) 103950
10
rest of the fishing ground. Both the probability of households commer-
cially fishing and fishing incomes are similar to those villages without a 
tabu area. These findings are relevant when deciding to implement a 
tabu area in a community that relies heavily on commercial fishing; if 
tabu areas do not degrade fishing incomes, then conservation objectives 
can be achieved in conjunction with the village not suffering severe 
economic consequences. 
Households located in villages with active tabu areas consume 
greater amounts of easily grown crops and consume less fish. This 
finding runs counter to those of Leisher et al. [23] and Aswani and 
Furusawa [44]; who found higher fish consumption in villages with 
active tabu areas. However, this result may stem from reverse causality; 
that is, it is possible that villages that consume less fish are more likely to 
implement active tabu areas given the relatively lower impact these tabu 
areas would have on villager diets as opposed to the implementation of 
active tabu areas causing a village to consume less fish. 
Commercial fishing households in villages with active tabu areas 
believe that they have greater clarity around roles and responsibilities, 
feel that their communities could be relied upon to help in times of need, 
and have more positive views of the environment. From these findings, a 
possible inference is that villages with better organisation, social safety 
nets and appreciation of the environment are more likely to implement 
tabu areas. If such relationships exist, increasing uptake of tabu areas 
could be achieved by helping communities define roles and re-
sponsibilities more clearly, extend their social safety nets, and increase 
environmental awareness. 
Households that are located in villages with an active tabu area but 
do not fish commercially report that their communities hold more 
meetings to deal with issues and that there is greater conflict within their 
communities for marine resources. Since households that commercially 
fish do not perceive greater conflict, it could be that non-commercial 
fishing households simply perceive a greater conflict when there is an 
active tabu area rather than the conflict for marine resources actually 
being greater. It would also be expected that managing an active tabu 
area is likely to require more village meetings. Given that such discus-
sions focus on a resource that impacts commercial fisherman, their 
perception of the number of meetings is likely to differ from those whose 
livelihoods are not dependent on the resource. The perception of 
increased conflict within the community for marine resources aligns 
with the work of Bennett and Dearden [21]; who found similar per-
ceptions of inter-community conflict within marine reserves. This result 
could have implications for the ongoing management of marine re-
sources and community harmony; too much time spent managing the 
resource may lead households to push for the tabu status to be removed. 
Additionally, explaining to non-commercial fishing households why 
implementing and maintaining a tabu area neither indicates nor leads to 
increased conflict could help achieve greater uptake and sustainability 
of tabu areas. 
All households in villages with active tabu areas believe that their 
communities are in greater agreement and have a better understanding 
of LMMA policies and rules. They also believe that their communities 
have more respect for those enforcing LMMA rules. These findings 
suggest that active tabu areas are not detrimental to the communities’ 
understanding and agreement with the LMMA, supporting the notion 
that having tabu areas is unlikely to damage the success and longevity of 
the LMMA. 
The existence of a positive relationship between commercial fishing 
households and the belief that local values are compatible with LMMA 
goals could be born out of local stakeholder engagement that is central 
to the LMMA philosophy. It would be expected for commercial fishing 
households to be heavily involved in deciding what the goals of the 
LMMA are, more so than non-commercial fishing households. This 
relationship would support the notion that engaging the local commu-
nity in the functioning and design of their LMMA is essential for uptake 
and sustainability of the LMMA. 
We find a striking difference in perceptions of the severity of 
penalties for breaking LMMA rules among households who fish 
commercially. Commercial fishing households in villages with active 
tabu areas consider penalties to be high, whereas commercial fishing 
households in villages without an active tabu area do not. 
5. Conclusions 
MPAs (and LMMAs) are an important marine conservation tool. 
While there is evidence of the benefits of MPAs on marine resources, 
there is less information on the socio-economic impacts of MPAs. In 
particular, both the statistical framework and the quality and breadth of 
collected data have been lacking in this area, especially with reference to 
the social outcomes of imposing bans on extractive use in certain areas. 
Our research quantitatively explores the socio-economic differences 
between communities with and without active tabu areas in their LMMA 
in the province of Kadavu in Fiji. We find there are differences in eco-
nomic activity and diet between the communities but little difference in 
overall income and wealth. Our study shows that villages with an active 
tabu area have more positive social outcomes around perceptions of 
LMMAs. However, there are some notable negative social outcomes as 
well. In particular, we find that households not engaged in commercial 
fishing perceive conflict around the management of marine resources. 
We also find that households engaged in commercial fishing believe 
penalties for violating LMMA rules are high. Together, these results 
could impede the adoption of LMMAs and tabu areas. 
Our survey results indicate that tabu areas are neither detrimental 
nor beneficial from an economic or social perspective. We cannot 
establish any causal implications, however, because we have no data on 
villages before they implemented tabu areas. Determining the causal 
impacts of tabu areas would be useful and is a potential area for further 
research. Indeed, our survey data could provide the comprehensive 
baseline data needed to look at causal relationships for those villages 
that establish an LMMA in the future. 
Our analysis is only able to look at the presence or absence of a tabu 
area: we are not able to explore any links between tabu size and socio- 
economic outcomes. We are similarly unable to analyse other types of 
tabu area, such as rotational or periodic fishing bans. These additional 
aspects could provide some valuable insights into potential trade-offs 
that may arise with size and type of a tabu area. An analysis on tabu 
failure is also a worthwhile venture given the importance of maintaining 
no take areas for restocking but is also not possible with our available 
data. The potential findings of such analyses could aid in the design of 
LMMAs to best suit community needs while also meeting conservation 
goals. 
An important relationship for future consideration is that between 
the presence of a tabu area and health outcomes of villagers. Although 
touched upon here through the correlation between probability of 
consuming different sources of food and presence of a tabu area, we 
again cannot establish any causal effects. In addition, our survey ques-
tions were not detailed enough relative to diet and health for us to say 
anything meaningful about this relationship. In any case, future work 
that extends on our questions around diet and health could, in 
conjunction with our current data, allow for a better exploration of this 
topic. 
The use of MPAs, and more specifically LMMAs, is likely to increase 
given the greater recognition of marine resource degradation, the need 
for greater marine conservation, and the perceived and demonstrated 
benefits of the LMMA model. Often the burden of such marine conser-
vation falls on developing communities, the villages of Kadavu being a 
prime example. It is therefore important to determine whether these 
marine conservation tools impose undue harm, confer lasting benefits, 
or land somewhere in the middle. The findings presented here should 
help to answer this question. 
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